

## Democracy Dominates

KOBAYASHI Takuto

Neo-Roman republicanism proposes “freedom as non-domination” as a cardinal moral-political value: a person is free if and only if he or she is not subjected to the uncontrolled capacity of any other agent (whether natural or artificial, individual or collective) to interfere with his or her choices. This conception of freedom has motivated an influential justification of democratic political procedures that appeals to the notion of popular control. According to this *Control Argument*, the guarantee of equal opportunity to influence political decisions, which is a definitive feature of democratic political procedures, is essential to securing each individual's equal share in popular control over the state, which, in turn, is essential to each individual's avoidance of “public domination” by the state and its government. This paper challenges this justification by building on what it refers to as the *Discontinuation Objection*. This objection, developed in the literature, holds that an equal share in popular control does not amount to any individual's control over the state or its government in any relevant sense. By defending this objection against several responses, this paper concludes that, insofar as non-domination requires control by those potentially being interfered with, democracy constitutes public domination rather than eliminates it.